Abstract
Introduction
The recently adopted unitary patent package (UPP) introduces the European patent with unitary effect (EPUE) which will be available in all participating EU States. This will operate in parallel to, and will not replace, the classical European patent (EP) route which provides a single patent application route for applicants seeking patents in two or more European Patent Convention (EPC) States -currently 38 Contracting States including all EU States. Under the classical EP route, applicants apply to the European Patent Office (EPO) for a patent and if granted, the applicant receives a bundle of national patents in the EPC States designated in the application.
However, the post-grant life of these patents lies primarily under the individual jurisdiction of each national State.
In contrast to this, the EPUE's post-grant life will be governed by the newly created Unified Patent Court (UPCt) and it will have unitary effect 2 i.e. equal protection in all participating States. The UPP system significantly alters morality provision in both instruments provides that inventions will be unpatentable if their commercial exploitation would be contrary to "ordre public" or morality. Furthermore, Art. 6(2) of the Directive provides a non-exhaustive list of four categories of inventions which are specifically excluded under these provisions, namely: "(a) processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; (d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such processes." These four listed exclusions were also subsequently incorporated in the EPC framework. 8 These provisions have been chosen as a site of investigation because despite their identical wording in the EPC and the Directive, the open-textured nature of the general morality provision requires interpretation by the adjudicative bodies applying them in each institutional framework which defines the parameters of these provisions. Thus, it will be argued that institutional influences on adjudicative bodies are heightened in this context and as a result these provisions provide an ideal site to examine the significance of the addition of another adjudicative body, the UPCt to the European patent system.
Importantly, the problem which arises in this context is not the risk of divergence or differing interpretations per se; already in the classical EP system Contracting States have post-grant jurisdiction which accommodates divergence amongst national States on the application of the morality provisions. Instead, the difficulty which is exacerbated by the UPP is that the morality provisions will now be interpreted by three supranational adjudicative bodies, which this article argues are not institutionally configured to apply these provisions in the same manner.
If these bodies give unilateral or unitary interpretations of these provisions at a supranational level which deny patents on the basis of the morality provisions in all of their Contracting States, this would be problematic because many States have overlapping obligations under the Biotechnology Directive, EPC and the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court (AUPC).. Moreover, in this particular context, another issue is that States are generally afforded a margin of appreciation on moral issues. As will be examined, this approach has been expressly confirmed by the CJEU for the general morality provisions under the Biotechnology Directive 9 and this mirrors the jurisprudence of the ECtHR which provides deference to States on sensitive moral issues where there is no consensus. 10 However, the 'unitary' nature of the EPUE does not provide space for such national divergenceEPUEs must have equal protection in all States. This article argues that this is contrary to existing EU obligations to respect national traditions and that this aspect of the EPUE must be reconsidered to provide deference for States on the interpretation of the morality provisions. A proposed mechanism to achieve this is set out in part 4.
In taking this focus, the analysis makes an original contribution for three reasons. Firstly, despite extensive discussions on the UPP, 11 there has been very limited consideration of the relevance of this institutional change for the morality provisions. 12 This article fills this gap. In doing so, as noted, it argues that the introduction of the UPP in its current form is problematic for the morality provisions for two main reasons. Firstly, the UPP increases 8 Rule 28 of the Implementing Regulations to the EPC. 9 Case 377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-07079. 10 Yourow 1996, p 13. 11 Including : Kaesling 2013; Zawadska 2014; Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping, and Ullrich 2012; West, Kusumakar, Powell 2013; Kaisi 2014; Aerts 2014b; Ohly and Pila 2013; Pila and Wadlow 2014. 12 This is alluded to but not examined in detail in : Petersen, Riis and Schovsbo 2015; Kaisi 2014; Aerts 2014a . the institutional supranational overlaps within the current system thereby exacerbating existing institutional tensions by increasing the avenues for conflicting interpretations at a supranational level. This analysis resonates with and contributes to general discussions in international law on conflicting obligations under differing legal instruments and how these can be reconciled; 13 and to debates in relation to fragmentation of international law, albeit from a patent perspective. Secondly, the article argues that although harmonisation in the patent field is desirable in many contexts, the morality provisions are a peculiar case which require there to be leeway for States to differ in moral approaches. This leeway is currently provided under the classical EP route as post-grant issues are vested in the national State which provides a means to allow a margin of discretion to States on moral issues.
However, the 'unitary' nature of the EPUE expressly excludes divergence amongst States. This approach fails to safeguard protection for State's moral traditions e.g. should a case arise where one State wishes to deny a patent based on moral concerns where other States would be willing to uphold this. It will be argued that this is contrary to the EU's obligations to respect national identity, and to previous case law of the CJEU 14 confirming a margin of discretion for States on the general morality provisions. This article argues that mechanisms to facilitate deference for national States on the general morality provisions must be provided for. This in turn contributes to discussions of the need for a margin of appreciation for sensitive moral/ethical issues under the ECHR, and the balance that has to be maintained between allowing scope for strict international standards/principles whilst maintaining deference for States where necessary.
Secondly, this article is the first to apply institutional theory in this way to examine the morality provisions in the patent system. It uses understandings from institutional theory to formulate a novel template for examining the main institutional influences on adjudication in this system, detailed in part three. It then applies this to the proposed UPP system. This template although used here to analyse the morality provisions, is transplantable to other contexts and is useful for examining all instances where States have overlapping obligations to international instruments eg. States obligations to UN and EU treaties.
Thirdly, using this institutional approach the article argues that account must be taken of how substantive laws are likely to be interpreted in differing ways depending on the institutional contexts evident. This has important practical ramifications as it means that when normative proposals for legislative reform are made it is crucial to consider how these reforms are likely to be interpreted by supranational adjudicative bodies situated in differing institutional frameworks. Moreover, although this article is directed at the morality provisions this analysis is also
relevant for other open-textured provisions/concepts used in the patent system such as the patentability criteria as it argues that all open-textured principles are heavily shaped by the institutional framework within which they are interpreted which define the contours of such provisions.
The article is structured as follows: Part one commences by giving an overview of the UPP setting the foundations for the analysis. Part two then examines the increasing fragmentation at a supranational level which the UPP gives rise to and the consequences of this should conflicting interpretations arise. The article argues that given the UPCt's peculiar institutional characteristics it will have a differing underlying interpretative approach to these provisions in comparison to bodies such as the CJEU thereby increasing the potential for differing supranational interpretations of these provisions, unless it engages closely with the CJEU in the interpretation of such provisions. Part four then examines the unitary nature of the EPUE arguing that this will be problematic for the morality provisions because of: (1) the lack of scope in the current system to maintain discretion for States to respect differing moral traditions; and (2) it is unclear whether morality in this context will be judged at a national, UPP participating State, EU or EPC State level.
Finally, part five concludes by reiterating the significant influence that institutional frameworks have on adjudicative bodies which accordingly must be central to discussions on the formation of new courts such as the UPP, given the impact of this on the interpretation of substantive patent law, and particularly, on open-textured concepts. It argues that although there has been reluctance to involve the generalist CJEU in the UPP system, however, areas such as the morality provisions where broader social and human rights issues are at stake require oversight from the CJEU as specialist courts may become blinkered from broader considerations. Developing closer links with the CJEU through referrals from the UPCt to the CJEU where needed on such areas would help to minimise this risk and would allow the system to offer a balance between specialist and generalist expertise depending on the context which arises. Furthermore it argues that the UPP system must provide a means to maintain divergence for national States on the morality provisions -a form of moral subsidiarity -which the EPUE in its current form does not provide. 34 Thus, as will be discussed, unlike the Boards of the EPO, the UPCt is bound by EU law and can refer questions to the CJEU. However, the UPP is a specialist court dealing only with patent issues with members drawn from within the pool of patent practitioners, therefore in form it has more resemblance to the Boards of the EPO than the CJEU. These factors will impact upon how it may interpret the morality provisions and are examined in part three.
Overview of the Unitary Patent Package
In terms of the timeline for its implementation, the UPP will operate from the date of the entry into force of the AUPC. 35 This will come into effect four months after the AUPC has been ratified by thirteen Contracting States, provided these include the three States which have the highest number of EPs in force in the preceding year, currently, Germany, the UK and France. 36 However, the UK's vote to leave the EU is likely to delay the implementation of the UPP as until it leaves the EU it will still be considered a formal member of the EU and its ratification will be required 37 as a State with one of the highest number of patents in force. At the time of writing, the AUPC has been ratified by ten countries, not including Germany or the UK. 38 Thus, it is likely to be 2018 or later before it comes into place, with much depending on the UK's withdrawal from the EU. However, as the UPP becomes closer to reality, far from being welcomed, the package and compromises that have been necessary to bring it to this stage have been criticised extensively. 39 Nonetheless, it appears to be going ahead despite such concerns, and when it takes effect, it will have significant implications for the morality provisions.
The Institutional Landscape under the UPP: Further Supranational Fragmentation in the

Application of the Morality Provisions
The proposed UPP introduces a third supranational forum, the UPCt, and increasing layers to the already fragmented European patent system. In doing so, it changes the institutional framework within which the morality provisions are adjudicated upon, particularly at the post-grant stage where the changes create further possibilities for overlapping interpretations at a supranational level. This is demonstrated by analysing the pre and post grant stages of the planned UPP framework examined in part 2.1 and 2.2 below. This is followed in 2.3 by a critical analysis of the consequences of this deepening supranational fragmentation should conflicting interpretations arise.
Implications for the Morality Provisions at Pre-Grant Stage under the UPP
An EPUE is obtained in the same way as classical EPs: the EPO acts as granting body assessing patentability requirements. The EPO undertakes this role in spite of the fact that the EPUE will only be available in participating EU States and that EU law has primacy within the UPP system. This raises questions as to the defensibility of the application of the morality provisions if, as will be argued in part 3, the decision-making bodies of the EPOrg and EU are not institutionally configured to interpret these provisions in the same manner.
Nonetheless, the EU Commission 40 has stressed that the Biotechnology Directive has been "fully integrated in the legal framework of the European Patent Organisation" 41 and the patentability requirements for EPUEs are identical to classical EPs. However, despite the voluntary convergence between the EPOrg and EU at a legislative level, this article argues that the interpretation of the morality provisions at an adjudicative level is deeply bound to, if not contingent upon, the institutional frameworks within which decision-makers operate. Considered from this perspective, it would be impossible to fully integrate the interpretative practices of the CJEU into the EPO's decision-making framework without fundamentally reconfiguring the institutional framework within the EPOrg.
Thus, whilst it is accepted that the UPP does not change patentability criteria, there are already arguably distinctions between the EU and EPO adjudicative bodies' interpretative approaches to the morality provisions which give rise to questions surrounding the defensibility of the application of the morality provisions, across and between the EPOrg/EU systems. Given that the UPP system retains the EPO as a granting body under the UPP these institutional issues remain. Indeed, given that the UPCt is in form more akin to the Boards of the EPO, arguably if anything it exacerbates such underlying issues, a point which is returned to in part three.
Implications for the Morality Provisions at Post-Grant Stage under the UPP
Turning to the post-grant stage, as noted, the EPUE is ancillary to and does not replace the classical EP or national patent scheme. 42 Once adopted, the UPCt will have jurisdiction for all EPUEs, and following a transitional period, it will have jurisdiction for all classical EPs granted to participating States. 43 Therefore, once in force, four overlapping protections for patents will exist within the European patent system, namely: (1) a national patent granted by national EPC Contracting States; (2) an EPUE granted by the EPO with post-grant jurisdiction vested in the UPCt; (3) a classical EP granted by the EPO but with post-grant jurisdiction governed by the national States;
and (4) an EP granted by the EPO valid in the AUPC Contracting States whose post-grant life will be governed by the UPCt. 44 These changes alter the adjudicative bodies charged with the interpretation of the morality provisions should a challenge arise on this basis at the post-grant stage through revocation actions, 45 and also reinforce institutional complexities for opposition proceedings. who obtain an EP validated in AUPC States can opt-out of the UPP system. 51 To opt out, a patentee must notify the registry and the opt-out will take effect on its entry onto the register. 52 Once registered, an opt-out means that the UPCt has no jurisdiction over the EP patent bundle and instead, the patents will be subject to relevant national jurisdictions.
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Thus, a complex institutional framework arises whereby EPs are granted by the EPO, and decisions on revocation will be governed either by national courts or the UPCt depending on whether the State is party to the AUPC and during the first seven years depending on whether the patentee has opted-out. Moreover, the UPP needs just the required thirteen ratifications to come into effect. This means that initially it could be an EPUE in thirteen States, increasing to an EPUE in fourteen States etc. depending on when states ratify. This increases the institutional complexity within the system. The diagram below offers a basic overview of the supranational adjudicative bodies 
Opposition Proceedings
Turning to opposition proceedings, under the proposed UPP scheme, the unitary effect of the EPUE created has an 'accessory' nature meaning that it: "…should be deemed not to have arisen to the extent that the basic European patent has been revoked or limited" 54 . Accordingly, if an EP is successfully challenged through opposition proceedings in the EPO, the EPUE validated as a result will be deemed not to exist. Thus, despite the fact that generally post-grant issues relating to the EPUE are dealt with by the UPCt, opposition proceedings in the EPO will continue to exist. Therefore, at any one time a patent could be challenged on the grounds of the morality provisions through opposition proceedings in the EPO, and also revocation proceedings in the UPCt or national court. The UPCt must be informed of any pending opposition proceedings before the EPO and may decide to stay proceedings if a rapid decision is expected from the EPO. Having said this, the EPO to date has generally taken a light touch approach to the general morality provisions favouring patent grant where possible. Therefore, it is unlikely that this situation would arise. Of more concern in terms of potential divergence is if the EPO dismisses an opposition proceeding and upholds the patent, and a subsequent challenge to the patent through revocation proceedings in the UPCt is accepted. This would create the possibility of conflict as this would render the patent invalid in all AUPC Contracting States, which will be the majority of EU States (subject to all participating States ratifying the agreement) but it would remain valid in non-AUPC States.
Implications of Institutional Changes for the Morality Provisions
As has been demonstrated, the UPP will significantly alter the adjudicative bodies responsible for revocation proceedings, giving rise to increased institutional overlaps involving three supranational decision-making actors;
the Boards of the EPO, UPCt and the CJEU. Moreover, although the UPCt has links to the CJEU and the UPCt;
however, as will be discussed in part three, this does not mean it will share the CJEU's interpretative approach, and discussions on the UPP suggest a reluctance in involving the CJEU in the UPP system. Thus, the proposed system creates the possibility of further fragmented moral spaces at the supranational level as one will have overlapping areas governed by the UPCt, the CJEU and Boards of the EPO, and these adjudicative bodies may offer differing interpretations of these provisions given their differing institutional contexts.
To illustrate the difficulties which may arise, consider a decision of the UPCt in a revocation action which invalidated an EPUE on the basis of the morality provisions. the primacy of EU law within the UPCt system and the fact that the EPC is also a source of law for the UPCtthat the UPCt was applying EU law along with the EPC in its decision. If this can be presumed, the denial of a patent by the UPCt in AUPC States would give rise to questions as to its validity in such non-AUPC States. To justify a differing approach, it could be argued that the consensus on morality within AUPC States differed from non-AUPC states. However, it is unlikely that one would have an overwhelming consensus on the morality provisions in twenty five EU States, but not in the remaining non-AUPC States.
To resolve conflicting interpretations, a ruling relating to the UPCt would bind non-participating EU States if the UPCt made a referral to the CJEU whose decision would bind all EU States. Failing this a challenge of the patent in each national court would be necessary to render it invalid in the remaining EU States. Moreover, as there is no binding link from the UPCt or CJEU to the EPOrg, the only means to render such a patent invalid in EPC States who are not in the EU, is through national challenges to the patent grant in each State or opposition proceedings to the EPO. In short, the overlapping supranational layers add considerable complexity to the already multi-layered system leaving open the possibility for conflicting supranational interpretations of the morality provisions. This is problematic due to the overlapping obligations of many States involved to the relevant international agreements evident, namely: the Biotechnology Directive, EPC and AUPC.
Institutional Influences on the UPCt in the Application of the Morality Provisions
The proceeding section outlined the deepening supranational fragmentation which the UPP will create and the likely practical issues should conflicting interpretations arise. This section highlights why this is particularly significant in the context of the morality provisions. It argues, that 'institutions' such as the EPOrg, and planned UPP system, within which adjudicative bodies are situated give rise to distinctive frameworks wherein adjudicative bodies are subject to differing constraining and predictive influences, and these influences may limit or guide decision-making outcomes. This section commences by outlining a template mapping the main categories of constraining/predictive influences in any institutional framework set out in 3.1; then 3.2 argues why these institutional influences are heightened in the context of the morality provisions; and, finally, 3.3 applies this template of factors to the UPP to analyse the main institutional influences on the UPCt and how these are likely to influence its interpretation of the morality provisions. They are also influenced by past decisions in related areas to which analogies might be drawn given the need for consistency and coherence across a legal framework. Past decisions at a legislative level are also significant as adjudicative bodies must interpret the underlying legal framework by reference to the purpose of the legislation and principles set out within it and related legislation.
Secondly, predictive influences can be discerned within any framework. These are influences which indicate the way a decision-making body may be influenced on a particular question but are not legally constraining, an example is: (3) the structure, role and composition of judicial/quasi-judicial bodies. Analysing this feature offers insights into how adjudicative bodies can be predicted to act and how external factors might influence decision-making in a particular context as they shape the interpretative community evident. 58 Finally, of particular relevance is the (4) inter-institutional influences exerted on adjudicative bodies which can be either a constraining or predictive influence. In the legal context, this may be a constraining factor if there are hierarchies existing between institutions e.g. the legal obligations the EU would have to the ECHR system should it accede to it. Inter-institutional relationships may also be highly persuasive even if not constraining, e.g. consider the EPOrg's relationship with the ECHR system, where although the EPOrg is not party to the ECHR it arguably will still seek to abide by Convention law given that all of its Contracting States are Convention parties. Analysing inter-institutional relationships therefore offers predictions as to the behaviour of judicial/quasi-judicial decision-making bodies situated within these overarching institutions.
Importantly, this template of factors does not seek to dismiss other influences within an institutional framework nor does it claim to track all influences on decision-making. Rather, it highlights some of the main categories of influences which arise within any institutional framework, and which are significant in the context of the European patent system given many States' overlapping obligations under the EPOrg/EU and now planned UPP system.
The Morality Provisions: A Heightened Context for Institutional Influence
Such institutional influences are heightened in the context of the morality provisions because of the: (a) the openended nature of the legislative provisions and (b) the malleable and subjective nature of morality. Open-textured provisions are those which Hart described as "…a mere legal shell and demand by their express terms to be filled 57 Aristotle, A Treatise on Government (trans W Ellis) (J M Dent, 1912) 1252b -1252a: 'For what every being is in its most perfect state, that certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house: besides, whatsoever produces the final cause and the end which we desire, must be best; but a government complete in itself is that final cause and what is best.' cited in MacCormick 2007, p 36. 58 Drahos 1999, pp 441-442. out with the aid of moral principles…". 59 This aptly applies to the morality provisions in the patent system under both the EPC and Biotech Directive as the adjudicative body called upon to interpret these provisions is forced to act as legislator in "formulating the deficit in the legislation". 60 This is because aside from the list of four inventions which are expressly excluded from patentability under Art. 6(2) of the Biotechnology Directive, replicated in the relevant Implementing Regulations of the EPC -and these have also required judicial interpretation 61 -there is little by way of guidance 62 for decision-makers on the scope which the general morality provisions should take or the tests/standards that should be used to assess its application. 63 Consequently, adjudicative bodies are left in the unenviable position of having to decipher the parameters these legislative provisions should take. In doing so, decision-makers must act within the legal constraints on them, and are also likely to be cognisant to ensure any decisions taken by them will be accepted by the community which the institution speaks to or serves 64 which is where predictive influences are of relevance.
Secondly and relatedly, the nature of the morality provisions provides scope for institutional influence as whilst in deciding on the morality of a specific act, we as individuals will arguably internalise the issue and based on our individual values and experiences decide on whether we deem an act moral or not. However, in this context, decision-makers are asked to decide upon the morality of the commercial exploitation of an invention not in their capacity as individual actors, but as representatives of a court/quasi-judicial body which in turn speaks for the overarching institution, i.e. the EU/EPOrg or UPP system. In doing so, decision-makers will consider the decision by internalising it not individually but through the eyes of the sub-institution (the judicial/quasi-judicial body) and in cognisance of the overarching institution in which they are situated: thus an institutionally-subjective application of the morality provisions results. This is supported by Neil MacCormick's work which argues that legal reasoning on moral dilemmas takes place in a highly institutionalised context. 65 Seen in this light, the institutional framework evident acts as a prism through which moral questions are considered and filtered in order to reach a decision which is deemed most appropriate for decision-makers representing a particular institution and given the legal constraints on such decision-makers.
In short, adjudicative bodies will give institutionally tailored interpretations of open-textured provisions such as the morality provisions. These interpretations will align with the respective purposes/final causes, competences 59 and characteristics of the institutions within which the decision-making bodies are situated. Taking this view, the institutional framework within which decision-makers act is highly significant for the end outcomes of decisionmaking. These frameworks are integral to how they refract, internalise and eventually give an interpretation to the morality provisions.
Institutional Influences on the Morality Provisions under the UPP
The foregoing has demonstrated the significance of institutional influences on the application of open-textured provisions such as the morality provisions. That being the case, it is useful to consider the constraining and predictive influences which may arise in the UPP system and how these are likely to influence the UPCt's interpretation of the morality provisions. Notably, explicit path dependencies of the UPCt cannot be considered as it has not come into operation yet so it does not have its own history to influence it. Therefore, the path dependency category will not be examined directly. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged implicit path dependencies are likely in this context; in particular, influences from the EU are likely given that the UPP was an EU proposal and given the UPCt's link with the CJEU and the primacy of EU law under the AUPC. However, as these influences do not stem from the history of the UPCt itself, they will be examined where relevant in the other categories below, and the role of the CJEU will be considered under the inter-institutional category.
Applying the template of factors to the UPCt it is demonstrated to be a peculiar body which exists between the current EPOrg and EU systems. It is also a hybrid body in the sense that it is not an EU court per se, but has links to the CJEU, however, in characteristics it is more akin to the Boards of the EPO. Therefore, as will be seen, it will provide a distinctive institutional framework for the interpretation of the morality provisions and much is likely to depend on how the relationship between the UPCt and CJEU develops. "…the cooperation amongst the Member States of the European Union in the field of patents contributes significantly to the integration process in Europe, in particular to the establishment of an internal market within the European Union characterised by the free movement of goods and services and the creation of a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted."
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The Preamble to the AUPC also refers to the Charter of Fundamental Rights noting that it is part of the sources of law applicable to the UPCt. 69 However, outside of this reference there is no discussion of the role of human rights or dignity in the application of the AUPC nor are the broader social goals of the EU referred to. This is perhaps unsurprising given that the AUPC deals with all inventions and not just biotechnological inventions and it is in this latter context, that human rights issues have been particularly contentious. 70 Nonetheless, the absence of references to broader EU goals in the AUPC alongside the repeated references to the harmonisation goals and the fact that the UPCt sits in a somewhat disjointed manner to the EU judicial system, suggests these broader social objectives may not be channelled as directly through the UPCt as they would be within the CJEU.
The objectives set out in Regulation 1257/2012 and the AUPC are also relevant. The primary aim of the Regulation 1257/2012 is stated as being to achieve unitary patent protection in Contracting States, 71 whilst the AUPC seeks to set up one decision-making body for the adjudication of patents within Contracting States in order reduce fragmentation and achieve this unitary goal. This is affirmed in the Preamble to the AUPC, which highlights the detrimental effects of variation across countries in the patent context. These legislative instruments set out primarily economically framed objectives which prioritise removing fragmentation within the European patent system. If the UPCt perceives as its main function the harmonisation of patent law within a European market, then it may perceive broader social functions narrowly, particularly as no detailed reference to these is alluded to in its statutory instruments.
Composition, Structure of the UPCt
Secondly, turning to the structure and composition of the UPCt, the UPCt is a specialised court 72 which deals solely with "the settlement of disputes relating to European patents and European patents with unitary effect".
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In light of this specialised nature, the UPCt may become insulated from broader considerations which generalised courts such as the CJEU adjudicate upon on a daily basis. Instead, the UPCt's role is more akin to the Boards of the EPO than the CJEU, and similarly to the EPO, judges in it are likely to be unaccustomed to adjudicating upon explicitly moral issues and accordingly may be reluctant to decline patents on this basis, particularly if they are operating within a framework which prioritises harmonisation and the furtherance of the internal market. Indeed, Petersen, Riis and Schovsbo have highlighted the main risk of specialisation is that the UPCt may develop:
"…certain biases that lead the court to downplay or even disregard issues of a general societal nature unrelated to the technical issues of patent law." 79 In light of the objectives of the UPP, they argue that a bias may result which favours achieving agreement and avoiding diversity. 80 Moreover, they argue that specialised courts have been recognised as being more likely to follow or identify with the objectives and statutory scheme they are administrating and may identify too strongly with their litigants. 81 Accordingly, such judicial members may "develop a tunnel vision and become overly sympathetic to polices furthered by the law that they administer or who are overly sympathetic to "capture" by the bar that regularly practices before them." 82 Institutional theories support and reinforce these points and considered together these arguments, suggest that the UPCt may focus closely on the objectives set out it its statutory scheme setting up the UPCt and in doing so may seek to preserve a narrow interpretation of the morality provisions.
Inter-Institutional Influences: The UPCt and the CJEU: A Bridge over Troubled Waters?
In terms of inter-institutional influences and how these may influence the application of the morality provisions, a crucial factor, is the UPCt's relationship with the CJEU. This distinguishes it from the EPO and depending on how this relationship develops it could offer a potential bridge to mediate differences between the EPOrg and EU.
In this context, the UPCt may make requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU to ensure the consistent and uniform application of EU law. 83 Referrals can be made by the CFI or Court of Appeal in the UPCt and in such cases, there will be a stay on the proceedings 84 until the CJEU has delivered its opinion. However, some commentators have expressed reluctance for patent law to come under the influence of the CJEU in this way. 85 One of the main objections to the CJEU's role in this area is on the grounds that it is a generalist court whose judiciary do not have the required expertise and knowledge of patent law. This is deemed to be problematic given the specialist and technical nature of patent law and questions have been raised in relation to the quality of judgments the CJEU would deliver. 86 Other concerns include the potential for the CJEU's involvement to cause delay and increase the costs of proceedings. 87 Indeed, there are limited substantive legal provisions in the AUPC which in itself limits the CJEU role. However, unlike other areas of patent law where there are is no EU legislation applicable, the Biotechnology Directive provides a number of substantive provisions on patent law including the morality provisions. Therefore, decisions of the UPCt concerning the meaning of the morality provisions under Art. 6 of this Directive fall directly within the remit of the CJEU.
The UPCt has significant responsibility in this context because once it becomes operational, it will not be different national courts referring matters; rather it will be the UPCt which will decide exclusively on such issues 88 for
EPUEs and EPs granted in EU States party to the AUPC. However, if reluctance is already being expressed around the CJEU's role, this suggests the UPCt may only make limited reference to the CJEU in future. This reluctance to involve the CJEU appears to stem from a mistrust of the CJEU in the 'technical' field of patent law. This aligns with a view of the patent law as insulated or fenced off from the broader legal and ethical issues. 89 Contrary to this view, whilst acknowledging the need for scientific expertise in examining technical issues relating to patent applications, this article argues that the application of the morality provisions is an area which explicitly involves broader social issues and would benefit from the input of a generalist court like the CJEU. This is particularly true if, as recent case law suggests, the morality provisions are to incorporate human rights considerations more broadly.
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In short, a balance is needed on the CJEU's involvement depending on the issues raised: broader social issues or those involving human rights may require oversight from the CJEU, whilst technical, scientific questions should generally be resolved by the specialist UPCt. 91 However, it is crucial that patent law is not viewed as solely a technical/scientific endeavour. The grant of a patent and patent law generally may give rise to fundamental questions of rights and/or important social questions particularly in relation to biotechnological inventions.
Indeed, the Biotechnology Directive makes express reference the protection of fundamental rights and to the need for patent law to be applied in a way which safeguards human dignity. 92 It is thus vital that some oversight from the CJEU is embraced. Furthermore, if the UPCt became closely aligned with the CJEU on such issues it would also be useful as the UPCt has the ability to provide an indirect judicial check on the EPO in its application of the morality provisions.
Currently, following patent grant by the EPO, aside from a referral to the CJEU which denies a patent and is applicable in all EU States, a patent needs to be challenged individually in each EPC State to render it invalid. In contrast, the UPCt system offers a single track to invalidation in participating States should a revocation action before the UPCt succeed as UPCt decisions have automatic effect in all AUPC States. Hence the denial of a patent by the UPCt would place pressure on the EPO to conform to the UPCt approach; as to do otherwise could jeopardise the EPO's patent grant role. Thus, the UPCt could help forge a process of soft harmonisation at an adjudicative level between the EPOrg and EU. has the potential to introduce an indirect judicial check on the EPO in the grant of patents, and to act as a bridge between the EPOrg and EU in this context. Having said this, if it adjudicates on the morality provisions with limited input from the CJEU, its institutional characteristics as examined above suggest that it will be institutionally predisposed to apply the morality provisions in a manner which may not necessarily align with broader EU goals or aims in the Biotechnology Directive. Indeed, it is not at all clear whether the UPCt itself is institutionally structured to deliver on the goals of the Biotechnology Directive in its interpretation of the morality provisions which may give rise to questions surrounding the defensibility of these provisions.
The Morality Provisions and the 'Unitary' nature of the EPUE
Aside from these core institutional issues, also relevant to the application of the morality provisions is the unitary nature of EPUE. Art. 7 does not mean the unitary patents must be interpreted in a uniform way in all cases involved rather a particular EPUE must be treated in a uniform way and must be interpreted according to the national law of one State for the entire territory of the enhanced co-operation. 109 It has been questioned whether this complies with Art. 118 of the TFEU 110 as it fails to provide for uniformity between patents in respect of the property aspect. In the context of the morality provisions the reference to "Member State" in the singular in recital 39 of the Biotechnology Directive, noted above, is significant as whilst the provision to date had been interpreted as giving discretion to MSs should they wish to deny patents, it is questionable whether Art. 7 applied in this context could be used to support the view that the law of one State should apply in this manner.
If this provision applied to the morality provisions it would mean that the UPCt would be required to judge the challenge by reference to the law of one State. This would apply the moral tradition of one State in all States, thereby bringing the moral tradition of one State would be brought to bear on all MSs. This would be contrary to EU responsibilities to protect MS's moral traditions 111 and also contrary to obligations under the ECHR. Article 6(2) of the Biotechnology Directive, detailing the specific morality provisions is not in issue in this context as it has previously been accepted that this provision must be interpreted in a uniform manner in all EU States.
However, it would be deeply problematic if applied to Art 6(1) of the Biotechnology Directive as it would lead to the UPCt having to enforce a uniform interpretation in all States using the standard of one State as a baseline. It could also engender uncertainty and forum shopping where States perceived as having strict moral traditions could be avoided in patent disputes by changing one's place of business.
Conclusion
A unitary patent system was expected to offer a more institutionally sound basis for assessing the morality provisions than provided under the classical EP route. 112 However, the UPP as it currently stands gives rise to deeper institutional questions for these provisions. The EPO remains the granting body and therefore none of the existing institutional questions have been addressed. Moreover, at post-grant stage, the UPP results in further fragmentation of the European patent system by adding the UPCt and increasing many States obligations to differing international instruments. This is practically problematic as at the most basic level even discerning who has jurisdiction over classical EPs will be difficult particularly during the transitional period when applicants may opt-out of the UPP system. More troubling, is that under the UPP and the morality provisions will be applied by three supranational decision-making bodies, which as demonstrated in part three are situated in differing institutional contexts and thus are not configured to apply these provisions in the same manner. If these bodies
give interpretations denying patents on the basis of the morality provisions in all of their Contracting States, this could give rise to conflicting interpretations which is problematic given States overlapping obligations to differing international treaties.
One means to ameliorate tensions in this context is for the UPCt to develop strong links with the CJEU in the interpretation of morality provisions. This article has argued that these provisions are an example of an instance where the CJEU's generalist perspective is deeply warranted. Contrary to views which have argued in favour of limiting the role of the CJEU in the UPP system, this article argues that it is vital for the UPCt to refer cases involving issues of substantive EU law which gives rise to broader social or rights questions to the CJEU should the need arise. In taking this view, the article acknowledges the need for specialist expertise on technical/scientific issues that arise in patent law, however, social issues are also deeply implicated in the patent context and we must ensure the UPCt does not become a vehicle to insulate patent law from such broader concerns. Moreover, if the UPCt developed links with the CJEU in the context of the morality provisions thereby aligning itself closer to the CJEU, its functions could be used to act as a check on the role of the EPO, as decisions of the UPCt bind all AUPC
States and CJEU decisions (should the UPCt refer a question to it) would bind all EU States. This in turn would have persuasive influence on the EPO given that EU and AUPC States would make up a large proportion of the EPO's thirty eight States. This would allow a means to achieve soft harmonisation between EPO and CJEU practices, which may be necessary in some cases given the institutional influences these bodies are subject to. The 111 Kaisi 2014 , p 179. 112 Plomer 2009 article has also demonstrated that a reluctance by the UPCt to involve the CJEU in the application of the morality provisions would cause difficulties as it is not clear that the UPCt, is institutionally configured to deliver similar interpretations/reasoning on the morality provisions as the CJEU would give should the case arise.
Another issue which must be revisited in the context of the morality provisions is the 'unitary' nature of the EPUE.
This does not provide any means for States to diverge on moral issues in this context. This is contrary to EU and ECHR obligations to respect national traditions and identities. It is also contrary to the Biotechnology Directive and to the CJEU's decision in the Netherlands case which confirmed a scope of manoeuvre for national States on the morality provisions. Instances of States refusing patents on moral issues are likely to be rare occurrences but they are nonetheless significant, and should be accommodated. In order to do so, the article proposes a system of obtaining opinions from national courts on the morality provisions should a challenge arise. If States wish to deny patents on this basis, there should be a means to convert the EPUE back into a classical EP bundle to respect such views and also allow it to be valid in other States. This would also address the question over whether morality should be adjudicated at a national, AUPC State, EU or EPC State level in such context, as each national State view would be accounted for.
More generally, this article has demonstrated, the significance of institutional frameworks for the interpretation of open-textured provisions such as the morality provisions. It set out a novel template in part 3, applied here to the UPCt, but which can be used in other contexts to examine such issues where overlapping State obligations to multiple international instruments arise. Crucially, it has argued that 'institutions' are vital factors and forces in the examination of decision-making and this needs to be firmly recognised and embedded into discussions on the establishment of new courts, such as the UPCt.
